

and very formidable. They show, as the *St. James's Gazette* puts it, that the discontented natives have lost all respect for English authority. This is a very serious thing, because although India was acquired by the sword it has not been held by the sword, but by the terror of the sword, which is a very different matter. The British conquerors continued to impress the natives with the utter hopelessness of resisting British power, and this impression has lasted down to our time. It was not seriously or permanently shaken by the Sepoy mutiny, so swift and so terrible was the retribution that followed that uprising. While this impression lasted a small garrison could hold India for the English, a garrison large enough only to serve as a symbol of British power in the eyes of the natives, and to suppress such casual disturbances of the peace as might be made. But when the terror of British power is dispelled there will be required the constant presence of a body of troops strong enough to reconquer the country in order to hold it against a population not only hostile, as the population of British India has always been, but defiant, as that population has never until lately been. It is, indeed, in the spirit of defiance that the late scattered revolts exhibit, and in the feeling they show that the conquered have a chance of beating their conquerors, that the main significance of these revolts consists.

This feeling is quite new, and on the face of things it is tolerably evident that it has been inspired from without and not from within. There have not of late years been any such scandals or any such exhibitions of weakness on the part of the British Government as would account for it. The difference is that Great Britain has now a powerful and skillful rival in the East—a rival who avowedly aims at the control of Asia up to the borders of British India, and may fairly be suspected of designs upon British India itself. The great advantage of Russia in this struggle is the superior faculty the Russians have shown for getting on with the natives. The British, who find aliment for the national vanity in almost everything, attribute this to the fact that Russian civilization is lower and, therefore, more akin to Asiatic civilization than the British. However that may be, it is certain that the Russians understand the Asiatics much better than the English do. All Anglo-Indian literature, from RUDYARD KIPLING'S sketches backward, testifies to the ignorance of the British rulers concerning the people over whom they rule, and even to their pride in that ignorance. It is a dangerous thing to be proud of when a powerful enemy, which does not share it, is endeavoring to undermine their authority. For there can be little doubt that the new spirit the natives of India are showing and their new contempt for the British power are the result of skillful and persistent machination on the part of the agents of Russia. This fact makes the "understanding" between France and Russia the more important to Great Britain. She might safely maintain neutrality even in a general European war, but she could scarcely maintain neutrality in a war in which Russia was a combatant, and in which the Russians would look for the prize of victory not in Europe, but in Asia. Plainly the interests of Great Britain are with the Dreibund, and all reports that she may oppose it may safely be disregarded, whether they come from St. Petersburg, from Paris, or from London itself.

#### THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.

It has become manifest to Englishmen as well as to Anglo-Indians that British rule in India is now in a more precarious condition than it has been since it was established, with the single exception furnished by the Sepoy mutiny more than a generation ago. The anxiety felt upon the subject is shown by the frequent meetings of the Indian Council, and it is reflected in the columns of the best-informed English journals.

The revolts that have broken out in various parts of India during the past year are not in themselves very threatening. There is not one of them which a detachment of troops of very moderate number has not sufficed to put down. But as symptoms these revolts are very significant